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I. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court justices, like the rest of us, hold strong beliefs and convictions. But when
those convictions involve the soundness of a challenged precedent, should that affect the Court’s
stare decisis analysis? Stare decisis features frequently in some of the most hotly-contested,
politically-charged Supreme Court decisions of recent decades. Majorities and minorities alike
lean on the doctrine with such fervor and frequency that any argument can seemingly be made to
show stare decisis as either the “preferred course,”1 merely a “principle of policy,”2 or even
sometimes both in the same opinion.3 Nevertheless, stare decisis and the role of precedent remains
so pervasively interwoven within our conception of the American legal tradition that it helps
comprise our understanding of what the law is.4 Though deference to precedent may shape the
law, what stare decisis is—and is not—remains an evolving and ever-changing formulation.
The term “stare decisis” comes from the Latin phrase “stare decisis et non quieta moevre,”
which means “to stand by things decided and not disturb what is tranquil.”5 Given the unsettled
nature of the doctrine, it is ironic—though perhaps not altogether shocking—that common legal
parlance omits half of the phrase. Black’s Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as doctrine
requiring courts “to abide by authorities or cases already adjudicated upon,” and further refers to
it as “ [t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
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decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”6 While understanding a blackletter
definition does not show the doctrine’s functionality, recent cases display the inconsistent ways in
which the Court approaches the question of whether to adhere to its own precedent.7 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME8 only further clouds the doctrinal practicalities of an already
tough-to-pin-down principle. Janus ushers in new concerns about the state and direction of stare
decisis because of the depth of its detailed examination of the quality of the challenged precedent’s
reasoning.9
In the wake of Janus, various legal minds have expressed concern with its stare decisis
implications. Justice Kagan’s dissent decried the “subver[sion of] all known principles of stare
decisis,” noting the majority’s disregard for the heavy reliance interests at stake.10 Professor
Fuentes-Rohwer considers Janus a “judicial foray into a politically charged controversy,” thus
raising concerns about the Court’s legitimacy.11 Focus on poorly-reasoned precedent and Justice
Kennedy’s departure from the Court present further questions. By joining the Janus majority,
Justice Kennedy affirmed the view that a past precedent may be set aside because of the quality of
its reasoning.12 Should Justice Kavanaugh share different views than his predecessor on concepts
like substantive due process, the Court could question the reasoning of precedents comprising
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Kennedy’s legacy.13 The Cato Institute embraced the decision’s stare decisis framework that they
claim “largely mirrored” key portions of their amicus brief.14 Professor McGinnis of Northwestern
University believes Roe v. Wade (finding the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s right to an
abortion)15 and Morrison v. Olsen (affirming the constitutionality of the independent counsel
statute)16 are potentially open to criticism based on their reasoning.17 After all, divergent views
on constitutional interpretation inform whether a particular justice agrees with the reasoning of a
past precedent.18 What may be poorly-reasoned to a textualist could at the same time contain
sound legal theory to a legal pragmatist.19
Stare decisis promotes some of the most vital, yet fragile underpinnings of our judicial
system. The doctrine supports notions of certainty, consistency, and impartiality.20 Stare decisis
is essential to the rule of law because of the importance of stability and moderation.21 These values
are imperative to the vitality and health of the legal system.22 The doctrine imposes judicial
restraint by preventing justices from “reconsider[ing] every potentially disputable issue as if it
were being raised for the first time . . . .”23 Further, because “public acceptance of judicial decisionmaking is grounded on an apolitical picture of judges as interpreters of the law,” the Court’s respect
for stare decisis, particularly on a matter on which there is grave political pressure, serves as an
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integral part of the Court’s survival.24 A more flexible iteration of the stare decisis doctrine—
employing mechanisms by which mere disagreement with past precedent weighs heavily against
retaining what had theretofore been the law of the land—would rob precedent of any weight
whatsoever.25
If five justices feel that a challenged precedent is supported by what they consider bad
reasoning, does that, has that, and should that weigh against overturning precedent? To answer
these questions, this Comment will scrutinize the genesis and evolution of the poorly-reasoned
consideration and how that factors into the Court’s recognized stare decisis framework. In Part II,
this Comment will analyze the Court’s decision in Janus with particular focus on the majority’s
treatment of stare decisis. Part III will examine the historical progression of precedent to
demonstrate its evolution over time. In Part IV, this Comment will offer a thorough exposition of
the present factors which comprise the doctrine and important cases which implicate and explain
stare decisis. Part V will review the poorly-reasoned factor, beginning with its origins, tracking
its usage, analyzing how its consideration in Janus differs from prior usage, and the inherent
problems with the appearance of judicial politicization and subjectivity. Part VI will argue for a
clarification of the poorly-reasoned standard, address different possibilities by considering varying
degrees of focus on the reasoning of a challenged precedent, and ultimately advocate for a middleground approach that incorporates the consideration but limits the role it can play in a decision to
ultimately overturn past precedent.

This normative proposal urges that consideration of a

precedent’s reasoning be non-dispositive, grounding any reasoning defects in objective concerns.
Lastly, Part VII will offer a brief conclusion.
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II.

JANUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

To understand the renewed scrutiny the Court put upon the stare decisis doctrine, one must
fully understand the recent precedent-overturning case that brought it to the forefront. Mark Janus
was a child support specialist for the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, who,
as an Illinois public employee, was permitted to unionize under state law.26 When a majority of
public workers opt for union protection, the union becomes the only entity which may negotiate
labor contracts with that respective public institution.27 The American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (the “AFSCME”) represents approximately 35,000 public
workers in Illinois.28 Because Mr. Janus disagreed with policy positions for which the union
advocated, he opted out of union membership.29 Mr. Janus therefore was not required to remit full
union dues, but instead paid a lesser, so-called “agency fee.”30 This covered the costs of collective
bargaining, but not the AFSCME’s political activities with which he disagreed.31 Even though he
was not a union member, Mr. Janus’s compensation, benefits, and other terms of employment were
set by the collectively-bargained contract, which the AFSCME negotiated in part on his behalf.32
In an earlier case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of agency fees in the public sector context.33 There, all nine justices agreed that
a public labor union could require non-members to pay fees to support the collective bargaining
pursuits without impinging upon the non-members’ constitutional rights.34 These arrangements
were permissible so long as the funds collected went toward activities germane to collective
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Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461.
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Id. at 2461.
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bargaining and not to ideological or political causes.35 The Court rested its decision on two other
decisions which similarly held such arrangements permissible in the private-sector union context.36
The only union due schemes that implicate the First Amendment are those which require public,
non-union-member employees to support political speech with which they disagree.37
Overturning Abood and writing for the majority, Justice Alito in Janus held that extraction
of agency fees from public sector employees unwilling to join their union did violate the First
Amendment and that Abood was wrong in holding otherwise.38 The Court analyzed the Abood
doctrine under applicable First Amendment principles, finding the precedent an outlier among
First Amendment cases.39 More recent cases found that the justifications for Abood did not
withstand exacting scrutiny.40 After holding that Illinois’s scheme violated the First Amendment,
the Court then addressed whether the doctrine of stare decisis nevertheless weighed against
overruling Abood.
Stare decisis is the favored approach, the majority began, “because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”41
The doctrine, the Court recalled, is weaker in cases which interpret the Constitution, and perhaps
even at its weakest in decisions which wrongly deny First Amendment rights.42 Alito listed

35

Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 226 (“[Hanson and Street] appear to require validation of the agency-shop agreement before us.”).
37
Id. at 236.
38
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
39
Id. at 2482.
40
See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2014).
41
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991)).
42
Id.
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standard stare decisis considerations but added an additional, more infrequent factor: the quality
of the challenged precedent’s reasoning.43
Opting to address the reasoning factor first in the Court’s stare decisis analysis, Alito
recited dicta from Harris v. Quinn, written just four years prior.44 In Harris, the Court could not
reach the issue of agency fee permissibility to rule on Abood’s constitutionality because the
plaintiffs were not public sector employees per se.45 Nevertheless, Harris still thoroughly and
categorically condemned Abood’s reasoning, concluding that it had “questionable foundations,”46
even though the merits of Abood were not at issue.47 Janus also attacked Abood by contending
that it fundamentally misunderstood the legal precedents applied, failed to appreciate the primary
distinction between public and private-sector collective bargaining, neglected the extent to which
the rule would lead to administrative dilemmas, and lacked the foresight to appropriately gauge
the impact the rule would have on nonmembers.48 So thorough is Alito’s discrediting of Abood’s
premises in Harris that, in Janus, he states that he “will summarize, but not repeat, Harris’s lengthy
discussion of the issue.”49 The language in the two pages in Janus detailing Abood’s shortcomings
closely tracks the seven pages from Harris which discussed the same issue.50

Id. at 2478–79 (“Our cases identify factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past
decision. Five of these are most important here: the quality of Abood’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it
established, its consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and
reliance on the decision.”). The evolution of this consideration as a stare decisis factor and its ramifications are
addressed at length in Part V, infra.
44
134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
45
Id. at 2638.
46
Id. at 2632–38.
47
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479. Abood relied principally on two cases—Hanson and Street—which, as Alito discussed
in Harris, were inapplicable because of the inherent differences between public and private sector employers in union
agency fee contexts. Because of the unwarranted reliance on these two cases, Abood addressed the constitutionality
of agency fees under weaker scrutiny not typically employed in speech cases. This more deferential standard, Alito
contended, allowed the Abood court to deem that the purported state interests, labor peace and free rider mitigation,
passed Constitutional muster. Id. at 2480.
48
Id. at 2478–81.
49
Id. at 2483 (emphasis added).
50
Compare Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479–81, with Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2627–34 (2014).
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The remainder of Janus’s stare decisis analysis generally accords with the considerations
from Planned Parenthood v. Casey.51 Janus questioned Abood’s workability because it created a
rule which had proven “impossible to draw with precision.”52 In the intervening decades since
Abood, the Court clarified the test used to determine which types of union activities were
chargeable to non-members and which activities were non-chargeable because they crossed the
boundaries into compelled speech.53

Further, the Janus respondents, while advocating for

retaining Abood, conceded that the chargeable/non-chargeable distinction was vague and
sometimes led to erroneous results.54 Indeed, the respondents themselves agreed that the Court
could draw a firmer line.55 Alito explained that this concession “only underscores the reality that
Abood has proved unworkable: not even the parties defending [it] support the line that it has taken
this Court over 40 years to draw.”56
Alito’s stare decisis examination also recognized changes to both the legal and factual
underpinnings of Abood that weighed in favor of its overruling.57 Abood was an outlier among the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, as referenced in its precursors, Knox and Harris.58 From
a factual standpoint, Abood received similar heavy criticism. Abood did not require, but merely

51

See infra Part IV.C.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459.
53
See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991) (devising a three-part test requiring that chargeable
expenses be “germane” to collective bargaining, “justified” by the government’s interests as explained in Abood, and
not significantly further burden free speech.). This was not the first time that the Court addressed Abood. See also,
Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 (1986) (requiring a union to provide nonmembers
with “sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.”).
54
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 2482.
57
Id. at 2483.
58
See id. at 2463 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (“[I]n more recent
cases we have recognized that this holding is ‘something of an anomaly.’”); See also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (“[I]n
Knox . . . we pointed out that Abood is ‘something of an anomaly.’”). But see Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local
1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (“Acceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification for compelling nonmembers to pay
a portion of union dues represents something of an anomaly.”).
52
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permitted, states to adopt agency fee arrangements.59 By the time the Court heard Janus, some
twenty-two states had statutory and regulatory schemes based in whole or in part on the Abood
precedent.60 Free-rider mitigation and labor peace—the interests found by Abood to warrant
permission of agency fees—had not run amok in any of the twenty-eight states which opted not to
adhere to the doctrine.61 On the contrary, Alito asserted, the years between Abood and Janus had
shown the folly of such heavy-handed public employment focus.62 The public fiscal crises
propelled by rising salaries and pension underfunding in many of the states requiring Abood-like
arrangements bore this out.63 The Abood court did not have the evidence of its own experiment to
consider.64
While the dissent and the respondents strongly advanced reliance interests as the most
pervasive factor weighing in favor of retaining Abood, the majority, while purportedly
understanding these concerns, felt dependence on reliance interests “lacked decisive weight.”65
The statutory schemes of twenty-two states—primarily large, populous states like Illinois,
California, and New York—permitting Abood-based agency fees were part of the legal framework
upon which hundreds of public union contracts existed and balanced.66 Even though agency fee
availability likely factored into the bargaining process at the time of the negotiation of these untold
thousands of applicable contracts, reliance interests were not determinative because, as Alito
wrote, “it would be unconscionable to permit free speech rights to be abridged in perpetuity in

59

Abood, 431 U.S. at 217–34.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 2483 (noting that the “ascendance of public-sector unions has been marked by a parallel increase in public
spending . . . . Not all that increase can be attributed to public-sector unions, of course, but the mounting costs of
public-employee wages, benefits, and pensions undoubtedly played a substantial role.”).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 2484.
66
See Brief of Mayor Eric Garcetti et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct.
2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) LEXIS 158.
60
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order to preserve contract provisions that will expire on their own in a few years’ time.”67
Contractual interests could not overcome the vindication of constitutional rights.68 Given the
Court’s fairly recent tact against Abood, as shown in Knox, Harris, and Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Association,69 public unions should have been on notice that Abood’s days were
effectively numbered.70 The Janus decision took eight pages to summarize, explain, and evaluate
whether the stare decisis doctrine weighed against or in favor of overruling Abood.71 While
precedent-overruling inquiries do not always receive comprehensive treatment, the extent to which
the majority addressed stare decisis provided the dissent with ample opportunity to critique it.72
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus took issue with the merits of the case and the quality of
the majority’s reasoning, but also addressed what the four-justice dissent considered the
“trivializ[ing] [of] stare decisis.”73 The dissent cited some serious concerns regarding the state of
the stare decisis doctrine in light of the decision to abandon Abood. The Court “succeed[ed] in its
6-year campaign to reverse” Abood.74 Because neither Knox nor Harris addressed the ultimate
question addressed in Janus, Kagan explained, such heavy reliance on them was as misplaced as

67

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484 (majority opinion); But see Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where
reliance interests are involved.” (quoting Payne, 501 U. S. at 828); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009)
(“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where
reliance interests are involved.” (quoting Payne, 501 U. S. at 828)). Justice Alito authored the majority opinion in
Pearson which quoted this line, but the decision in Janus did not.
68
Id. at 2484. Severability clauses served as a built-in safe guard against contractual chaos for reasons like Abood’s
overturning. Id. at 2485.
69
136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
70
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485. After the decisions in Knox and Harris, the Court granted certiorari in Friedrichs v.
California Teachers Association in January 2016, but the death of Justice Scalia the following month resulted in an
evenly-decided court issuing a per curium opinion in March that same year. James Taranto, The Lawyers Who Beat
the Unions, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-lawyers-who-beat-the-unions1530314801.
71
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–86.
72
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 599 (2011).
73
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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the inexplicable and unnecessary depth of analysis Abood’s reasoning received within them.75
Additionally, because so many binding contracts were negotiated with the understanding that
agency fee arrangements would remain the law of the land, reliance interests remained profound.76
Concerning the reasoning of the challenged precedent, while the dissent argued that Abood
“fit comfortably” within existing First Amendment principles, the majority’s contention that
Abood was poorly reasoned was insufficient to warrant overturning.77 Finding that all stare decisis
considerations weighed in favor of retaining Abood, Kagan concluded that “[t]he majority has
overruled Abood for no exceptional or special reason, but because it never liked the decision. It
has overruled Abood because it wanted to.”78 By “pick[ing] the winning side,” “black-robed
rulers” are now permitted to “intervene in economic and regulatory policy” by using the First
Amendment as a weapon.79
As with most decisions fraught with political implications, Janus received a mixed
reaction. Labor unions are generally seen as proponents of the Democratic Party, in large part
because the Democratic Party has long advocated for workers’ rights, including the right of labor
to organize.80 For that reason, any weakening of labor unions, either legislatively or judicially, is
often seen as motivated by partisan politics and a desire to weaken the Democratic Party.81
Punctuating this point, President Trump, on the morning of Janus’s announcement, hailed the
decision with a tweet which laid bare the partisan implications: “Supreme Court rules in favor of

See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2498 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Relying on [Knox and Harris] is bootstrapping—and
mocking stare decisis. Don’t like a decision? Just throw some gratuitous criticisms into a couple of opinions and a few
years later point to them as ‘special justifications.’”).
76
See id. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
77
Id. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
79
Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
80
See James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Vanessa Williamson, From the Bargaining Table to the
Ballot Box: Political Effects of Right to Work Laws, 3 (Jan. 30, 2018), https://jamesfeigenbaum.github.io/research/
pdf/fhw_rtw_jan2018.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
81
Id. at 29–30 (finding that Democratic candidates receive fewer votes when states weaken labor unions).
75
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non-union workers . . . Big loss for the coffers of the Democrats!”82 Other reactions dealt with the
more practical ramifications of the decision for public employees at large. Some non-union public
school teachers brought suits against their unions to recover previously-withheld agency fees.83
The organization National Right to Work created a “Janus Task Force” to help assist nonmembers
with opting out of their agency fees to ensure compliance with the new decision.84 For some, the
debate waged on, with some commentators taking issue with the premises which laid the
groundwork for the decision.85 If one cannot opt out of paying property taxes that fund public
schools—the opinions and teachings of which one may disagree—then compelled speech in the
agency fee context should be viewed no differently.86
Concerns with a looser iteration of stare decisis principles accelerated with the retirement
of Justice Kennedy. By siding with the Janus majority, Kennedy agreed that a constitutional
precedent could be cast aside based on the quality of its reasoning.87 This “downgrading” of stare
decisis to a “pliable consideration” will permit future courts to reverse some of Kennedy’s own
landmark opinions.88 The ensuing Kavanaugh confirmation hearings brought stare decisis to the

82

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2018, 7:11 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump
/status/ 1011975204778729474.
83
Kat Green, Calif. Teachers Sue To Recover Past Union Dues Post-Janus, LAW360 (Jul. 3, 2018),
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ab71c620-1faf-4e5e-b07b-018cc4202728/?context=1000516.
Alito
concluded his majority opinion by noting: “It is hard to estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from
nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First Amendment.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
84
Vin Gurrieri, 4 Post-Janus Developments You Need To Know, LAW360 (June 28, 2018),
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ee9742cf-1bc6-458c-80b8-ec7dcd79bb43/ ?context =1000516.
85
See Eugene Volokh, ‘The bedrock principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person … may
be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not wish to support’, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/30/thebedrock-principle-that-except-perhaps-in-the-rarest-of-circumstances-no-person-may-be-compelled-to-subsidizespeech-by-a-third-party-that-he-or-she-does-not-wish-to-support/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bc7a875eea55.
86
Id.
87
Jonathan Turley, Kennedy's Decisions Might Not Last, it Might Be His Own Fault, WASH. POST, June 28, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/kennedys-decisions-may-not-last-it-might-be-his-own-fault/2018/06/28/
e39c3298-7a87-11e8-aeee-4d04c8ac6158_story.html?utm_term=.b4d62c6d9ef9.
88
Id. (noting that landmark decisions like Lawrence v. Texas (invalidating anti-sodomy laws), Obergefell v. Hodges
(recognizing the Constitution affords same-sex couples a right to marry), Planned Parenthood v. Casey (reaffirming
a woman’s right to choose to end her pregnancy) were all five-to-four decisions which could be at risk given the focus
on a past-precedent’s reasoning, a “perfect weapon for activist judges.”).
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forefront, with concerns among many that Kavanaugh’s presence on the Court could represent a
fifth vote to overturn Roe v. Wade.89 In her much-anticipated remarks on the Senate floor, Senator
Susan Collins echoed these concerns, speaking to then-Judge Kavanaugh’s conception of stare
decisis, stating:
He believes that precedent is not just a judicial policy, it is constitutionally dictated
to pay attention and pay heed to rules of precedent. In other words, precedent isn't
a goal or an aspiration, it is a constitutional tenet that has to be followed, except in
the most extraordinary circumstances . . . . When I asked him would it be sufficient
to overturn a long-established precedent if five current justices believed that it was
wrongly decided, he emphatically said no.90
Despite Kavanaugh’s insistence that stare decisis ought to be respected, concerns with the
ultra-partisan perception of the Court, coupled with the acrimoniousness of the latter Kavanaugh
hearings, lead some to question whether the new Court, as constituted, will attempt to safeguard
its perception or dive further into partisan turmoil.91 While Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation
underscored the deep partisan judicial divide, it also inadvertently magnified concerns about
whether the merits of a precedent will continue to factor into the Court’s horizontal stare decisis
framework regardless.

89

See Carole Joffe, With the appointment of Brett Kavanaugh, Roe v. Wade is likely dead, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018)
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III.

THE PROGRESSION OF STARE DECISIS

The doctrine’s utility and evolution have changed since early concepts of precedential
deference first permeated the English common law tradition. Legal developments in England
helped spur the use of stare decisis in the Colonies, which then took firm jurisprudential root in
the nineteenth century. Perhaps not surprisingly, the way courts interpret the weight accorded the
doctrine has fluctuated over time. As the ideology of the Supreme Court oscillates, stare decisis
naturally factors more heavily in trickier 5-4 decisions as justices grapple with discarding or
retaining established legal principles. The Court’s ideological back-and-forth in the twentieth
century produced some foundational decisions which altered the doctrine. These changes helped
force the dilemma brought on by Janus. Tracing the function of precedent from England to the
present-day provides the necessary context for this inquiry.
A. Precedent from England to The Founding Era
The examination of stare decisis necessarily requires a review of the doctrine’s historical
underpinnings to fully understand the role of precedent and the shifting trajectory of the doctrine’s
effect on the Court’s jurisprudence. Traditions of consulting prior decisions to guide judicial
opinions have roots in the legal histories of the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman civilizations.92
Merely consulting prior decisions for their knowledge, however, is far different from a system of
legal analysis where prior decisions bind future decisions.93 Holding a judge to a past decision
with which he disagrees is a concept unique to common law courts.94 The role of precedent as a
controlling principle first began to develop and take hold in England during the Middle Ages.95
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At this time, judges would review news of past cases distilled in compilations called Year Books.96
During this period, a judge was free to disregard any past decision or court procedure with which
he disagreed.97 After Year Book publication concluded by the mid-sixteenth century, private case
reports took their place.98 Though partially unreliable, these private reports helped support the
growing legal attitude that common law courts should more readily adhere to their past
precedents.99
Though the use of precedent goes back to some of the earliest recorded legal histories, the
formal doctrine of stare decisis—that precedent binds a court—is a relatively recent legal
development.100 The doctrine, as recognized today, began to develop in the late-eighteenth and
early-nineteenth centuries.101

Preeminent English jurist Sir William Blackstone envisioned

precedent as a role of “general obligation.”102 He was the most influential scholar to advocate for
a strong version of stare decisis, considering it “an established rule to abide by former precedents,
where the same points come again in litigation . . . .”103 Adherence to precedent was required “to
keep the scale of justice . . . [from] waver[ing] with every new judge’s opinion.”104 While
Blackstone’s work served as a turning point in common law conceptions of stare decisis, it also
influenced the Founders’ knowledge of a jurisprudential ideal.105
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In its infancy, notions of stare decisis and the controlling role of precedent served as
foundational legal hallmarks passed down from common law courts to United States courts.106
The role of precedent in the early American legal system evolved initially as a measure to help
constrain the monarch’s power.107 Though lacking a cohesive or unified understanding of the role
of precedent, the courts of the early American legal system were nevertheless imbued with a sense
that precedent was a fundamental concept.108

In addition to the Framers’ awareness of

Blackstone’s work on expounding and codifying legal principles,109 Alexander Hamilton
referenced the importance of precedent in the Federalist Papers.110 In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton
wrote “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them.”111 Taken out of context, one could view Hamilton’s
remarks as a whole-hearted endorsement of stare decisis.112 This passage was written as part of
an argument for life tenure for judges, illustrating that they would require many years to familiarize
themselves with procedures and the law.113
Other Founding-era scholars with legal influence provided more thoughtful and forceful
commentary on the role of stare decisis. Madison espoused a more thorough view of the doctrine,
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in part as a result of his experience.114 He wrote that “precedents, when formed on due discussion
and consideration . . . [were to be] . . . regarded as of binding influence, or, rather, of authoritative
force in settling the meaning of a law.”115 Formed as a result of his shifting belief on the
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, Madison conceived a view of stare decisis where
deference to precedent was permissible when a legal opinion thoughtfully explained or construed
a law or the Constitution, but not when the opinion went so far as to change the meaning of it.116
Similarly, William Cranch, the Supreme Court’s second official reporter, wrote that “every case
decided is a check upon the judge,” and that judges should not depart from precedent without
“strong reasons.”117 While some scholars remain skeptical about the extent to which earlyAmerican legal writers intended to enshrine precedent within our founding documents,118 the
development and pervasiveness of stare decisis shortly thereafter cannot be questioned.119
The nineteenth century saw a dramatic increase in American judicial commitment to stare
decisis.120 Two distinct and varied occurrences spurred the growth of the doctrine: the rise of legal
positivism and the increased availability of law reports.121 Law reports—recorded transcriptions
of judicial decisions—initially sparse and unreliable in the late 1700s, were widespread and
reliable by the mid-nineteenth century.122 Positivist legal thought continued to take hold from the
writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, promoting the more widespread belief that cases
were law, not mere evidence of law.123 As reports of judicial decisions became widely circulated,
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so too grew the belief among scholars that those decisions themselves comprised law. From this,
a more recognizable version of stare decisis took root and developed to what we see today.
B. Twentieth Century Stare Decisis and a Weaker View of Constitutional Precedents
Any meaningful exposition of the current state of stare decisis must necessarily include a
discussion of its constitutional and statutory variations. The Supreme Court is less hesitant to
overrule past precedent in cases involving a constitutional question because of the importance
placed upon proper interpretation of the Constitution.124 Conversely, the Court is more hesitant to
overrule precedent in cases involving statutory construction.125 If a court incorrectly divines
legislative construction, Congress may simply legislate around the decision.126 If the Court
incorrectly decides a constitutional issue, the non-judicial mechanism by which to undo the
decision—amending the Constitution—is an arduous and seldom-used process.127 Therefore,
when convinced of a previous error in a matter of Constitutional interpretation, the Court “has
never felt constrained to follow precedent.”128
That the strength of precedent is determined by the type of matter before the Court is a
relatively modern concept which dates back to at least the 1930s. Justice Brandeis’s dissent in
Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Company codified this concept.129 Burnet questioned whether to
adhere to or overrule Gillespie v. Oklahoma,130 which invalidated a state tax provision as an
infringement upon interstate commerce.131 In an oft-quoted passage, Brandeis announced that
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“[s]tare decisis is not . . . an inexorable command.”132 Though in an immediately preceding portion
Brandeis remarked that in most cases it was of greater importance that the law “be settled than it
be settled right,” Brandeis later explained that, in matters of Constitutional concern, where
legislative correction is “practically impossible,” the Supreme Court “has often overruled its earlier
decisions.”133 Twelve years later—and after the Court’s renunciation of Lochner v. New York134—
the Supreme Court lent support to Brandeis’s contention regarding precedential departure when,
in Smith v. Allwright, the Court struck down a Texas voting requirement which barred AfricanAmericans from voting in primaries, thus overturning its own precedent in Grovey v. Townsend.135
Exclaiming that “when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent,” the Court overruled a prior case because of the “erroneous . . . application of a
Constitutional principle.”136 Commentators contend that Allwright stands as the turning point in
delineating this more flexible iteration of the doctrine in constitutional matters, deferring
exclusively to Brandeis’s dissent which itself was of “questionable historical pedigree.”137 This
differential standard continues to play an active role in the modern Court’s stare decisis
framework.138
The Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts addressed issues of constitutional interpretation
with far more frequency than did their predecessors in the century prior.139 While Brandeis’s
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“inexorable command” quote is now enshrined in a large number of decisions, only six came in
the sixty years between Burnet and Casey.140 This shows the frequency with which the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts, particularly, have taken up challenged constitutional precedents.141 This
relaxed standard, as forged by more recent Courts, is not without its detractors. Some argue that
“sliding scale” stare decisis is a product of the twentieth century, and completely at odds with the
legal notions of the doctrine during the early years of the Marshall and Taney Courts.142 “If the
Rehnquist Court is bent on abandoning a constitutional decision, it may do so with little more than
a citation to [Burnet and Allwright] and their self-fulfilling notion of an accepted practice.”143
Other members of the Court embraced the weakened constitutional stare decisis. Justice
Douglas preferred the tenuous nature of constitutional stare decisis, writing that “above all
else . . . it is the Constitution which [we] swore to support and defend, not the gloss which [our]
predecessors may have put on it.”144 But as it pertains to the ease with which the Court could
overturn its own precedent, Justice Scalia likewise complained that “the doctrine of stare decisis
has appreciably eroded” in more recent times.145 Notwithstanding the critiques of its membership,
the Court continues to purportedly apply a system of weakened stare decisis to constitutional
matters.146 The uptick in constitutional issues addressed by the Court brings with it a necessary
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increase in stare decisis analysis.147 But with Justices believing constitutional decisions permit
less precedential deference, the precise factors used in that analysis become all the more critical to
a stable determination of not only what the law is, but whether it will continue to be what it is.
IV.

CURRENT STARE DECISIS DOCTRINE

What are the conditions required for the Court to engage in comprehensive and meaningful
stare decisis analysis before overturning precedent? If stare decisis is tantamount to judicial
calculus, how does a justice show her work?148 Whether the Court requires a less-than-tangible
“special justification,” or objectively analyzes a list of codified and agreed-upon factors may
determine the extent to which a challenged precedent’s reasoning may be more or less likely to
factor in. Fairly recent cases which delineate and expose the current state of stare decisis reinforce
the open and unstable status of the doctrine. Understanding the interplay between these factors
helps better explain the present status and functionality of the doctrine.
A. Special Justification
As the Court moved through the Rehnquist era where more cases challenged precedent, the
Court began to settle upon a more codified framework for when to overturn prior decisions.149
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Some commenters theorize that the Rehnquist Court may have begun to adopt a more cohesive
stare decisis framework as a natural response to support the Court’s legitimacy in light of the
appointment of five seemingly-conservative justices by Presidents Reagan and Bush in a relatively
short period in the 1980s and early 1990s.150 Regardless of intention, the Court drifted toward a
more codified stare decisis framework during this time. This codification provided that overruling
precedent required more than disagreement with the prior ruling, but also some additional, “special
justification.”151 Noting that “adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional
cases,” Justice O’Connor explained that “any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands
special justification.”152
Five years later, Justice Kennedy set forth a series of factors to consider when deciding
whether such special justification exists.153 In discussing the importance of the stare decisis
doctrine, Kennedy explained that “stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the
Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and
preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon an arbitrary discretion.”154 First,
Kennedy explained that developments in the law since the writing of the challenged decision could
weigh against retaining that precedent.155 Next, the Court could consider whether the challenged
rule had demonstrated some unworkability.156 Lastly, whether the past precedent had befallen
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some level of publicly-perceived inconsistency with a “prevailing sense of justice” could weigh in
favor of overturning a prior decision.157 These three factors in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
lay the groundwork for Justice Kennedy’s hallmark elucidation of stare decisis, authored just three
years later.
B. Payne v. Tennessee
The buildup to the framework outlined in Casey was immediately preceded by what some
consider a less-than-thorough approach to stare decisis in Payne v. Tennessee, decided just one
term before Casey in 1991.158 Payne overturned the Supreme Court’s precedents in Booth v.
Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers, both of which held that the Eighth Amendment
precludes a jury’s consideration of victim impact statements in the sentencing phase of capital
trials.159 Booth was decided only four years before the Court overturned it in Payne, with
Gathers’ upholding of the Booth precedent in the intervening period. As noted by Justice
Marshall in his scathing dissent, the Court only overturned Booth and Gathers after a
consequential change in Court personnel.160 In his dissent, Marshall pointedly decried the Court’s
novel and cavalier approach to stare decisis, noting that the decision whether to overturn Booth
and Gathers was not a function of which parties in those cases “had the better of the argument.”161
Taking issue with the majority’s notion that a precedent is somehow weaker if decided by a
narrow margin in the face of “spirited dissents,” Marshall lamented that the Court leaves open the
possibility that any liberty hitherto protected by the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment
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could be “open for reexamination.”162 Concerned with what this meant for judicial legitimacy,
Marshall contended that an “impoverished conception of stare decisis cannot possibly be
reconciled with the values that inform the proper judicial function. . . . [F]idelity to precedent is
part and parcel of a conception of ‘the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned
judgments.’”163
Marshall’s dissent underscores the continued struggles to balance judicial legitimacy
within a proper stare decisis framework. He announced his retirement from the Supreme Court
just one day after the decision in Payne.164 The conservative Justice Thomas replaced Marshall,
and the Court granted certiorari in Casey the following January.165
C. The Casey Factors
Conservative commentators fully expected the Court, with conservative Thomas on and
liberal Marshall out, to overturn Roe v. Wade.166 Instead of bringing Justice Marshall’s concerns
about debilitated stare decisis to fruition with yet another change in the Court’s personnel ushering
in a change in personal liberties, the joint opinion in Casey provided one of the strongest
delineations of stare decisis ever announced.167 Casey, for this reason, is considered the high water
mark of stare decisis,168 with many articles utilizing the Casey framework in thorough
examinations of the doctrine.169 This Comment proceeds no differently.
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Casey retained the central holding of Roe, opting to reaffirm “a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion before fetal viability . . . [because] the State[’s] . . . previability interests are not
strong enough to support an abortion prohibition . . . .”170 Casey serves as the apex of strong stare
decisis doctrine because of the depth and importance of its treatment of the doctrine. There, the
Court announced that the arguments against Roe were outweighed by the “explication of individual
liberty . . . combined with the force of stare decisis.”171 While the opinion admits that, to some of
the justices, “abortion [is] offensive to our most basic principles of morality,” the stare decisis
considerations outlined in the plurality opinion supported the retention of Roe’s central holding.172
Casey set out four specific criteria which the Court should consider when taking up the question
of whether or overrule precedent.173 This analysis, which spans fifteen pages, is grounded in
“pragmatic and prudential concerns.”174 By accentuating the importance of the doctrine, the
opinion emphasizes judicial legitimacy, the overriding and pervasive justification for strong
precedential reliance.175
1. Reliance
Of the four “practical and pragmatic considerations” set forth by the Casey joint opinion,
three address whether the challenged precedent “can be reconciled with the continuity required by
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the rule of law.”176 The most outward-looking factor the Court considers is whether the challenged
precedent has engendered the type of reliance “that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling.”177 Here, reliance means not just commercial reliance as had been
previously examined,178 but also the social reliance implicit in the predictability of a particular rule
of law continuing to govern.179 Consideration of societal reliance highlights important stare decisis
justifications like predictability and fairness, and better permits a reviewing Court to determine
which cases it should not overrule.180 Reliance interests would weigh against overruling precedent
when to do so would “contradict what Americans have been told the Constitution requires.”181
Casey noted that, in the time since Roe, many Americans had “ordered their thinking”
around the availability of abortion, and that “the ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation” produced strong social reliance on the decision.182 While
reliance on the challenged precedent was not easily quantified, the costs of overruling it could not
be completely cast aside.183 Some have understood societal reliance—and the Casey stare decisis
framework in general—as an understandable response to combat the perception of an overtly
political Supreme Court.184 Others have decried what they perceive as the Court’s dereliction of
its duty to faithfully interpret the Constitution itself, and that deference to societal expectations
prevents the Court from carrying out its role of saying “what the law is.”185 Despite some scholarly
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criticism, the importance of societal reliance remains a key component of current stare decisis
doctrine.186
2. Workability
The Court may overturn itself if a precedent’s rule is “intolerable simply in defying
practical workability.”187 The Casey majority did not expand on this factor, most likely because
other cases offer a sufficient definition.188 For example, the challenged legal rule in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority189 proved unworkable because, in the nine years since its
inception in National League of Cities v. Usery,190 courts were unable to distinguish between
traditional and non-traditional governmental functions consistently.191 Similarly, Swift & Co. v.
Wickham192 discarded a three-year-old rule in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety193 because
judges failed to apply it consistently.194
The Casey Court found that Roe had not become unworkable because it merely provides a
“simple limitation beyond which a state law is unenforceable.”195 Even though Casey abandoned
Roe’s trimester framework, a fairly substantial portion of the precedent, the mere need for judicial
review and enforcement of a precedent does not by itself negatively implicate its workability.196
Workability continued to play a role in whether to overturn precedent in a later case. In Pearson
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v. Callahan,197 the Court reversed a procedural requirement announced just eight years earlier in
Saucier v. Katz,198 which required qualified immunity inquiries to proceed in a specified order
because “experience had pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”199
3. Remnant of Abandoned Doctrine
When a precedent has eroded to the point where its “doctrinal footings [are] weaker than
they were” at the time of the original decision, such that it remains an outlier amongst more recent
jurisprudence, the precedent is more easily overturned.200 This factor was discussed briefly in
Patterson,201 but most noticeably employed in another politically-charged case decided some
eleven years after Casey: Lawrence v. Texas.202 The underpinnings of Bowers v. Hardwick203 had
weakened in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans,204 depriving the former of
the force on which its reasoning principally relied.205 The precedent challenged in Casey was
upheld no less than three times by the Supreme Court in the first thirteen years following the initial
decision.206 If a legal principle evolves to the point where a challenged precedent has little
remaining effective force, it is more easily overruled. Roe rested upon a series of principled and
uneroded cases which, Casey argued, kept the doctrine on firm footing.207 Roe and the substantive
due process progeny it embodies was “not a series of isolated points, but mark[s] a rational
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continuum.”208 Even if Roe’s central holding was wrong, the Court contended, its continued
application would not diminish the liberty upon which it is based, but merely alter the extent of
the state’s pre-viability interest.209 The clear implication is that the erroneousness of a past
decision—even one as controversial as a right to an abortion—was not, without more, a sufficient
justification to overrule precedent.
Whether stare decisis should consider the effect of a precedent as part of an abandoned
doctrine inquiry has provoked some criticism. Some claim that a Court can simply overrule a case
incrementally by weakening its effect in one case, and then in a subsequent one, overrule it
altogether because of the erosion of the precedent at issue.210 Others remark that notable doctrines
abandoned throughout recent history have required more cases to chip away at the foundation.211
No matter the history of abandoned precedent, more recently-reversed precedents rely on doctrines
abandoned in a far shorter length of time.212
4. Changed Facts or Circumstances
When facts change or are viewed so differently “as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification,” a court may overrule precedent.213 This consideration addresses
societal understanding of the issue in question. Thus, Casey examined whether, in the two decades
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since Roe, the factual premises had transformed past the point of Roe’s usefulness and
relevancy.214 For example, Brown v. Board of Education reconsidered the separate-but-equal
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson and found a sufficient change in facts to warrant overturning
because the “badge of inferiority” with which people of color were stamped at the time of Plessy
no longer governed societal understanding.215 Likewise, Casey wrote that Lochner had also been
undermined by changed premises, explaining that the Great Depression had proved the failure of
laissez faire economics which Lochner—according to the plurality opinion in Casey—
embodied.216 Casey found no such erosion of relied-upon factual assumptions which undercut
Roe’s central holding.217 While advances in medical technology made abortions safer and brought
about fetal viability earlier than it had been in 1973, those changed facts did not weaken the
fundamental right, but instead only impacted the judicial solution addressing the competing
interests at stake.218
Casey’s factors remain the most comprehensive codification of the stare decisis doctrine.219
Yet, the Court’s recent emphasis on the quality of a challenged precedent’s reasoning provides a
new set of challenges and concerns because the Court’s ability to circumvent Casey could also
mean circumventing stare decisis.
V. THE REASONING FACTOR
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The extent to which a challenged precedent’s reasoning may weigh against its continued
following dates back, as does the doctrine, to the Medieval era.220 Because medieval English
judges in no way considered themselves bound by a previous decision, most made decisions
regardless of how instructive a past case may have been.221 At times, mere disagreement with a
prior decision served as sufficient justification to adopt a separate rule.222 The amount of deference
a precedent received depended almost entirely upon whether a current judge agreed with the
reasoning of a prior decision.223 Because they were not bound by precedent in a per se, formalistic
sense, judges “stood above all precedent.”224 Later legal theorists expounded on the notion that
reasoning plays a role in a precedent’s retention.225 Blackstone, himself a fervent supporter of
strong stare decisis, contended that judges ought to neglect precedent only when a previous
decision is “flatly absurd or unjust,” or “evidently contrary to reason.”226 The level of a decision’s
wrongfulness plays a part in the modern standards of appellate review, where courts may reverse
a lower court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous.227 In light of the legal history
of precedential reasoning and the way in which erroneousness factors into other facets of modern
judicial calculus, consideration of a challenged precedent’s reasoning flows naturally from these
other legal foundations.228
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Tracing the evolution of the reasoning factor through the cases Janus cites for the
proposition uncovers a thin line of support. In Janus, Alito announced “[a]n important factor in
determining whether a precedent should be overruled is the quality of its reasoning.”229 Janus
cites Chief Justice Roberts’s Citizens United v. F.E.C. concurrence, as well as the majority opinion
in Lawrence for the contention that the quality of a precedent’s reasoning serves a proper stare
decisis function.230 Incidentally, Roberts’s Citizens United concurrence was devoted entirely to
stare decisis in order to defend the majority from claims of judicial activism.231 Citizens United
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce’s ban on corporate political speech.232 The
majority was right to overrule the challenged precedent, Roberts wrote, in part because Austin had
proved to be a source of persistent judicial criticism.233 The government urged the Court to retain
Austin upon two new compelling interests that the Court had failed to recognize and upon which
the precedent was not based. This proved most damning to Austin’s prospects for retention, as
these implicit concessions “underscore[d] its weakness as a precedent of the Court.”234
This treatment of stare decisis in Citizens United is not without its criticism. Professors
Silver and Kozlowski take issue with the stare decisis analysis in Citizens United, calling the
relevant factors considered by Kennedy’s majority opinion and Roberts’ concurrence “relatively
new,” “completely novel,” and “problematic.”235
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Roberts’s reliance on the “soundness” of the challenged precedent.236 Their stare decisis analysis,
adequately distilled, underlines this central point: soundness of a past decision becomes merely
another way of agreeing with that prior decision and tends to rob precedent of its otherwise binding
effect.237 Silver and Kozlowski also find fault with the notion that a precedent which has persisted
amidst continued controversy and criticism is somehow less deserving of precedential weight.238
Academic criticism notwithstanding, Janus’s reliance on Citizens United, while logically
consistent, does not strengthen its stare decisis argument, but instead begs questions about the use
of a precedent’s reasoning.
The case made for considering a challenged precedent’s reasoning in Lawrence—also cited
in Janus—is even more insubstantial. Kennedy’s stare decisis analysis in Lawrence includes
discussion of crucial reliance interests and how they weigh in favor of overturning the precedent
in Bowers.239 The opinion then turns to the “rationale of Bowers” by quoting a passage of Stevens’s
dissent in that case.240 The quoted portion of Stevens’s dissent makes two arguments which are
directly applicable to the majority’s reasoning in Lawrence.241 First, traditionally perceived
immorality is an insufficient basis upon which to uphold a law.242 Second, liberty, as protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the decisions of one’s intimate relationship, inclusive of
married and unmarried persons.243 The Lawrence majority states that Stevens’s analysis should
have been controlling then, and “should control here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided,
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and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.”244 While extolling the
wisdom of Stevens’s dissent, the Lawrence majority does not examine Bowers for its
wrongfulness, nor does the Court indicate that any wrongfulness of Bowers contributes to the
reasons that weigh in favor of abandoning it. Janus’s reliance on Lawrence’s insinuations of
precedential wrongness, therefore, appears ill-conceived at best.
Lawrence itself provides a less-than-perfect stare decisis showing because the Court
overturned its own precedent but failed to engage in a thorough analysis of the Casey factors.245
By failing to adhere to the Casey factors, the Court appears untethered to its own stare decisis
jurisprudence at a time—while justifying the overruling of a constitutional precedent of obvious
political importance—when consistency is inherently questioned. The Lawrence majority may
have reached the same decision about overturning Bowers had the Court methodically employed
the Casey factors in its analysis.246 Yet, because it did not, the Court left itself open to claims of
politicization and questions about its legitimacy.247 Still, others contend that Lawrence’s stare
decisis analysis satisfied objective concerns by properly showing that the majority’s problems with
the challenged precedent, Bowers, went well beyond “an overriding conviction of past error.”248
The reasoning language used by Alito in Janus—from Citizens United and Lawrence—
borrows stare decisis dicta from two other cases, Allwright and Payne, which altered constitutional
precedent and helped shape stare decisis doctrine.249 In Allwright, Justice Reed concluded by
noting that “when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow
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precedent.”250 Payne went further, linking the reasoning factor with the workability factor as
proper justification to overturn precedent.251 Despite the Court’s justifications of its treatment of
precedent, empirical data suggests that the Roberts’s Court most reliably endorses three factors in
practice: reliance, workability, and the quality of the challenged precedent’s reasoning.252 This
same analysis also discovered a correlation between the frequency with which a brief before the
Court demands that a precedent be overturned and the likelihood that precedent is in fact
overturned.253 For example, by the end of the Court’s 2015 term, of the seventy-seven precedents
challenged in briefs before the Roberts’s Court, only five cases had been attacked more frequently
than Abood.254
The primary concern with Janus’s view of stare decisis comes from the uneasiness implicit
in the depth of its review of the challenged precedent’s reasoning. Janus takes the poorly-reasoned
consideration too far, bringing its review of Abood dangerously close to simply re-deciding the
forty-one-year-old case on the merits.255 In so doing, Alito dilutes the potency of the doctrine and
ignores the importance of the justifications it supports. Identifying this dilemma does not, on its
own, bring forth a solution. But the depth of the problem should be thoroughly vetted and
understood before one posits a solution.
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Weakened stare decisis means less support for the justifications underlying the doctrine.256
Of the reasons advanced for its continued vitality, the promotion of certainty in the law is perhaps
the most frequently cited.257 Stare decisis also impacts the perceived equality of the judicial
system—one of the most deeply-entrenched notions of American democratic society—by helping
to ensure that cases and controversies receive the same treatment.258 Requiring adherence to
precedent also helps constrain judicial choice and, in so doing, helps foster impartiality.259
Impartiality, or at least the perception of it, is perhaps the most essential value served by stare
decisis.260 Faith in the entire system depends on the public believing that a judge’s personal
predilections do not factor into the equation.261 This is undoubtedly an unrealistic—if not also
unascertainable—expectation, and the normative proposal that follows attempts to account for that
reality, rather than that ideal.
A diminished conception of stare decisis would bring about less-predictable results in
matters that would have a profound impact on a variety of weighty constitutional issues. Abrupt
changes to liberties codified through cases like Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell v. Hodges
demonstrate the extent to which a sudden change-of-mind by the Supreme Court would alter the
daily lives of millions.262 Similarly, sudden changes to politically consequential doctrines from
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cases like Citizens United, Shelby County v. Holder, and Janus could sharply re-align the nation’s
political trajectory.263 If the public’s faith in the rule of law depends, in part, upon the stability
and consistency that stare decisis seeks to provide, any lesser version of the doctrine necessarily
risks less faith in the Supreme Court.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE POORLY-REASONED STANDARD
Stare decisis stresses the importance of certainty, yet the poorly-reasoned factor undercuts
that certainty altogether. The stare decisis tension between Casey and Janus means a higher level
of hesitation about how a challenged precedent will be examined, and ultimately whether it will
be overturned. Janus accentuates the trend of the Roberts’s Court, which makes clear that the
quality of a precedent’s reasoning continues to play a role in the Court’s decisions which implicate
stare decisis. The question is not whether a precedent’s reasoning should be analyzed, but how it
can and should be analyzed. This Section will offer three possible solutions for the poorlyreasoned factor, weighing the potential benefits and drawbacks of each. Ultimately, only one
remedy allows precedential consideration to supplement more traditional stare decisis
considerations while simultaneously constraining its ability to dominate the overall analysis.
Clarifying the reasoning factor’s functionality and confining its use helps foster consistency while
preserving the justifications for the stare decisis doctrine, vitally important to the survival of the
public perception of judicial objectivity and faith in the rule of law.
A. Poor Solutions for the Poorly-Reasoned Factor
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One possible answer to the question of whether the Court’s stare decisis framework should
include a challenged precedent’s reasoning is to just exclude it from entering the equation
altogether. This would minimize the possibility of a justice’s policy preferences influencing a
decision and guard against the perception of judicial subjectivity. It would also comport with the
views of Justice Kagan’s Janus dissent,264 as well as Justice Marshall’s dissent in Payne.265
Because legal scholars have also warned about overreliance on the poorly-reasoned factor, keeping
it out entirely seems a logical response to those concerns.266
This proposition is simply unrealistic. From a practical standpoint, justices will always
bring their preconceived notions, policy preferences, and personal beliefs to the particular set of
issues each case presents. The way some decisions link a precedent’s workability to the reasoning
factor indicate a predisposition to rely on one’s own beliefs about the strength of a precedent in
question.267 In an ideal legal reality where purely objective judicial decision-making is not just
ascertainable, but also identifiable, the complete exclusion of a challenged precedent’s reasoning
would certainly seem a benchmark worth striving. Such an ideal legal reality, however, is
unattainable. Accordingly, forcing a Supreme Court justice to cordon off or disguise his or her
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own inherent predispositions is not transparent. Clear expectations of the stare decisis doctrine
better serve the public’s faith in the judicial system.
At the other end of the spectrum, the counterpoint to complete exclusion altogether is to
not only include the quality of a challenged precedent’s reasoning, but to offer that consideration
controlling weight. In short, if a majority of the Court feels the past precedent is poorly reasoned,
then that alone could be sufficient justification to overturn past precedent. After all, if a justice
will always, consciously or otherwise, rely on his or her personal view of the merits of a prior
decision, then why not permit that factor to control?268
This too, for obvious reasons, misses the mark. While it would undoubtedly trim down the
necessary briefing, it would also permit blatant subjectivity to infect the stare decisis process.
Because predictability and consistency support the rule of law, placing controlling reliance on the
perceived rightness or wrongness of past precedent destroys any semblance of apolitical respect
the Court may still have in these bitterly partisan times. The Court should take strides to remove
itself from day-to-day partisan acrimony and trumped-up political showdowns.269 Making obvious
that “power, not reason” controls the Court’s decision-making, as Justice Marshall warned in
Payne, would shake one of the most important institutions of American democracy.270
B. The Way Forward: Inclusion of a Precedent’s Reasoning with Limited Weight
The soundness of a past precedent should be included in the Supreme Court stare decisis
formulations, but its weight should be limited. Including this factor serves as an acknowledgment

But see Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (“[T]he stronger argument is for affirming Roe’s central holding, with
whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us may have, not for overruling it.”).
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The integrity of the Court has been a purported goal of Chief Justice Roberts during his tenure. Some contend that
his vote breaking with the conservative wing and retaining the Affordable Care Act in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012) was an action geared more toward preserving the perception of an apolitical judiciary amidst intense political
scrutiny. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
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See Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of the impossibility of completely sanitizing all personal inclinations from important decisions.
Litigants should be on notice that the quality of a challenged precedent’s reasoning will be
evaluated by the Court when bringing a challenge to a precedent. Likewise, respondents arguing
in favor of retaining the old doctrine should be on notice that they should be prepared to justify the
precedent.271

By including the factor, the Court will naturally avoid the likelihood of an

ideological dissent decrying the subversion of stare decisis.272 Transparency in the judicial process
will help support belief in the Court and the rule of law.273
Whether a precedent truly is poorly-reasoned should hinge on more objective criteria. Such
conditions may include the legitimate consistency of the challenged precedent with other similarlyrelated decisions amidst the jurisprudence of the time.274 Additional, objective considerations
could also include the extent to which a challenged precedent is based on non-analogous legal
reasoning.275 For example, in Janus, one of Alito’s most convincing claims about Abood’s
reasoning was how it misused Hanson and Street’s conclusions about private agency fee
arrangements to justify them in the public sector.276 If Abood completely misapplied then-existing
First Amendment precedent, poor reasoning to that degree would be more firmly grounded in
See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481–82 (“Not even the parties defending agency fees support the line that it has
taken this Court over 40 years to draw.”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 383–84 (noting that the arguments made for
retaining the challenged precedent were not the same on which the precedent was based).
272
In light of Rehnquist’s language in Payne, avoidance of “spirited dissents” seems a worthwhile endeavor before
that issue develops into the next potential stare decisis consideration-to-be-included.
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See William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 754 (1949) (“The principle of full disclosure has
as much place in government as it does in the market place. A judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does
it will breed understanding.”).
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The most succinct way to illustrate this point is to liken it to the abuse-of-discretion standard of appellate review.
An opinion can be poorly-reasoned—for the purposes of precedential reasoning inclusion in stare decisis
formulations—if the then-existing operative law nearly required that the matter, in all likelihood, be decided one way,
but it was decided another. However, if the precedent is objectively poorly-reasoned, but that reasoning now runs
afoul of other Casey factors—most plausibly remnant of an abandoned doctrine or changed facts or circumstances—
such that the original reasoning that should have controlled is itself no longer operable, the Casey factors should
control. To allow to decades-old reasoning to still control would be to subvert the evolution of related doctrine.
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See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479–80 (noting that Abood was based on two cases which failed to adequately
address the First Amendment issues at play because the union agreements in Hanson and Street dealt with privatesector employment.).
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objective concerns.277 This focus on objective reasoning criteria generally accords with how some
scholars envision the role of the reasoning factor in stare decisis framework.278
Alito’s predispositions toward agency fees, and perhaps public employee unions in general,
as shown in Knox and Harris, bring forth dangerous concerns about the Court’s over-politicization.
That worry, while perhaps appropriately discomforting, does not on its own make Abood
necessarily worthy of retaining.279 Including the reasoning factor in the Court’s stare decisis
framework, while simultaneously limiting the role it can play, effectively guards against these
overly-political concerns. Whether Abood impinges upon the First Amendment to the extent
characterized by the majority, or whether reliance interests as strong as the dissent argues should—
or even ought to—outweigh that impingement, would comprise part of a healthy debate on the
existence of poorly-reasoned precedent.
Though it should be considered, the Court should not afford the quality of the challenged
precedent determinative weight. As explained in Part IV, infra, stare decisis draws on a series of
different considerations and weighs them together. These considerations, ideally the four factors
explained in Casey, should predominate the analysis because of their prevalence, persistence, and

See generally Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (“[W]hen
a court says that a past decision is demonstrably erroneous, it is saying not only that it would have reached a different
decision as an original matter, but also that the prior court went beyond the range of indeterminacy created by the
relevant source of law….[T]he doctrine of stare decisis could take account of this difference.”). Of course, reasonable
Justices could differ as to whether a prior court even went beyond that “range of indeterminacy.” Nevertheless, there
remains a distinct difference between weighing the extent to which a past precedent strayed from its jurisprudential
moorings and simply re-deciding a challenged precedent on the merits.
278
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Though upholdingthe
challenged precedent earlier on purely stare decisis grounds, recent legal challenges increased Stevens’ inclination to
overrule a decision that “can be properly characterized as ‘egregiously incorrect’”); see also Healy, supra note 25, at
1209–10 (Courts in practice more closely follow the “moderate presumption” model of precedential deference, or the
concept that “mere disagreement with an earlier decision is not enough to overrule . . . [but] the extent of disagreement
with the earlier decision can be taken into account . . . . [O]ne of the special reasons that will justify the overruling of
precedent is a conviction that the earlier decision was egregiously wrong.”).
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See Nelson, supra note 277, at 8 (“The doctrine of stare decisis would indeed be no doctrine at all if courts were
free to overrule a past decision simply because they would have reached a different decision as an original matter.”).
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objective focus. Even if a precedent is objectively poorly reasoned, the Casey factors should still
carry the calculus.
The concerning dilemma with Janus is not its political outcome, but the ease with which a
majority can choose different, and most alarmingly, unanticipated and enigmatic methods to arrive
at the stare decisis result. Because stare decisis is not a mathematic formulation, it is difficult to
definitively recognize the box-ticking mechanics of a particular stare decisis decision. In order to
ensure that the Court has not given determinative weight to the reasoning factor, Supreme Court
opinions that address comprehensive stare decisis concerns should proceed in a similar manner as
one another. For stare decisis to lean in favor of overruling an objectively poorly-reasoned
precedent, the Court should find a plurality of the Casey factors skew heavily against it.
A choose-your-own-adventure conception of the doctrine presents far too many risks.
Adhering to a consistent framework strengthens the doctrine and allows for better judicial
analysis.280 Whichever way the scales tip, the reasoning of a challenged precedent should not be
the controlling stare decisis factor. Other more traditional, and more ascertainably objective stare
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Several post-Payne articles urge a more consistent stare decisis framework and explain the detrimental effects of
an inconsistent doctrine, notwithstanding the merits of a particular decision or the idealized stare decisis norms for
which legal academics may advocate. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122
HARV. L. REV. 145, 153–56 (2008) (explaining the inconsistencies in Justice Stevens’ stare decisis approaches);
Payne, supra note 5, at 972–73 (failure of the Rehnquist Court to rigidly apply the Casey stare decisis framework in
Lawrence risks the appearance of politicization); Parker, supra note 248, at 196 (expressing concern with stare decisis
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Modification Of The Search Incident To Arrest Exception, U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (Calling for greater stare decisis
consistency in the wake of the Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant); David Crump, Overruling Crawford V.
Washington: Why And How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 155 (2012) (“[B]y departing from stare decisis without
analyzing whether the departure could be justified under the Court's decisions authorizing it, Justice Scalia arguably
engaged in reasoning that ought itself to be rejected.”). But see, Kurt T. Lash, The Evolution Of Theory: The Cost Of
Judicial Error: Stare Decisis And The Role Of Normative Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2206 (2014)
(arguing that “varying application of the doctrine of stare decisis is perfectly appropriate in a system that allows for
the application of normative constitutional theory.”).
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decisis factors, like the four in Casey, should predominate.281

The more consistent and

comprehensive the stare decisis analysis, the heavier the lifting done by the Casey factors.
C. Anticipated Criticism
One might object that this change to the stare decisis framework permits a justice to
include—or at the very least attempt to less-than-cleverly disguise—his or her views of
constitutional provisions at best, or his or her policy preferences at worst, in vitally important and
consequential constitutional decisions. Some would argue that this poison the well, openly
permitting a corruption of the process that stare decisis itself strives to prevent. Few would argue
that faith in the Supreme Court would be enhanced by discarding all notions of stare decisis
altogether. This attack presupposes that implicit judicial preferences can be definitively removed
from the equation. The solution proposed recognizes that they cannot and seeks to prevent judicial
subjectivity from controlling stare decisis. Tethering the poorly-reasoned factor to more objective
considerations and providing it only limited weight keeps any bias as appropriately and efficiently
cabined as possible.
Some may also disapprove of the inclusion of this standard because, even if it limits the
weight of the poorly-reasoned factor, any watering-down of stare decisis risks sharper ideological
swings on an already polarized Supreme Court. If established precedents are less likely to survive
a definitive change in Court membership, such quick ideological changes would upset legitimate
reliance interests and upend predictability, sullying the reputation of the Court. Concerns about
the extent to which Justice Kavanagh may provide a decisive vote for the conservative wing if
engaged in assaults on topics such as substantive due process or equal protection jurisprudence

This Comment’s normative proposal does not mean that utilization of this methodology would necessarily see
Janus’s stare decisis analysis come out differently than it did. Alito makes a compelling argument that Abood was
objectively poorly-reasoned. See supra note 275.
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underscore the severity of these apprehensions. These concerns, however, assume that, but for the
stare decisis doctrine, the Court would not otherwise limit its interpretation of challenged
precedents. Indeed, the Court frequently limits its precedents without overtly overruling them.282
And again, by constraining the use of precedential reasoning, the Court must still ground its stare
decisis analysis in traditional and objective criteria. This may not completely deter shifting
jurisprudence resulting from a change in the Court’s membership, but a departure from precedent
would still require justification over and above that personnel change. This proposal adheres to
that ideal.283
VII. CONCLUSION
A Supreme Court justice is not cleansed of all political inclinations or personal policy
preferences upon her swearing in. Indeed, a president selects nominees who will interpret the
Constitution in a manner consistent with each respective administration’s stated aims. Yet the
perception of the Supreme Court as being comprised of nine justices blindly voting in partisan
lock-step threatens to divest the entire system of the respect for process, and ultimately the belief
in the rule of law. Stare decisis helps to protect against such troubling prospects. The inclusion
of a challenged precedent’s reasoning in the Court’s stare decisis equation seeks to strike a balance
between the need for practical transparency and the defense of the entire institution. Codifying
but limiting the standard supports the justifications for stare decisis in general: stability,
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Casey made it easier for states to restrict abortions, and Harris all but signaled the end of Abood. See Harris v.
Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652–53 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Readers of today’s decision will know that Abood
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against such dangers.
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predictability, and judicial legitimacy. Because the perceived sanctity of the process is a vital end
unto itself, stare decisis should further sustain, not erode the perception of justice.
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